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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper aims to inform policy makers and stakeholders in the 
Philippines about the critical features of, and practical experiences 
with, federalism and decentralization in South Africa, Kenya and 
Ethiopia. The Philippines is currently considering revisions to its 
present  multilevel structure. Our description of the constitutional 
choices and subsequent experiences of these multilevel states provides 
an opportunity for reflection on how other countries sought solutions 
to the challenges they faced. This paper is also intended to provide 
some inspiration to those participating in the current discussions of 
constitutional revision in the Philippines.
The emphasis will be on South Africa with smaller remarks about 
Kenya and Ethiopia.
The aim of this paper is not to provide a detailed overview of the 
system of multilevel government in each of the three countries. Instead, 
the paper highlights a number of themes, which may be of relevance 
to the debates in the Philippines. It examines how the themes affected 
each of the three countries and how each theme was addressed.
1.1 South Africa
South Africa adopted a quasi-federal state structure in its 1993 
Constitution. The 1993 Constitution was the product of long and 
intense negotiations between the liberation movements, led by 
the African National Congress (ANC) and the outgoing apartheid 
government. A major point of contention was whether post-apartheid 
South Africa was going to be a federal state or not. The quasi-federal 
structure was confirmed and refined in the 1996 Constitution. The 
Republic of South Africa comprises a national government, nine 
provincial governments and 257 municipalities. All three levels (termed 
“spheres” in the Constitution) are entrenched in the Constitution. The 
system is advanced and well-developed in law and policy. It has been 
relatively successful in sustaining a peaceful transition to democracy 
and managing ethnic and racial tension. However, major challenges 
persist in service delivery and development, much of which is tied to 
significant parts of the South African state experiencing fragility. 
1.2 Ethiopia
Ethiopia’s 1995 Constitution established a federal state, comprising 
of a federal government and nine regional states. The Constitution 
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was adopted after a transitional period that included the secession 
of Eritrea in 1991 pursuant to a prolonged military conflict and a 
referendum among the Eritrean people. With 81 different language 
groups, Ethiopia is very diverse and bears the scars of decades of inter-
ethnic strife and suppression. Its federal design, which is unequivocal 
in granting each “Nation, Nationality and People” self-determination 
and its own territory, is a direct response to the challenge of bringing 
the Ethiopia’s diversity of ethnic groups together in one nation. The 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a broad 
coalition of national and regional ethnic parties, is firmly in control of 
the federal government, all nine regional states and all local authorities. 
Ethiopia has seen a period of relative stability since the adoption of 
the Constitution. It is experiencing high economic growth, driven by 
state-led infrastructure development and investment in the agricultural 
economy. Ethnic violence is resurfacing, however, prompting the 
government to declare a state of emergency in 2016 in certain parts of 
the country. One of the main points of contention is the status of Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital.
1.3 Kenya 
Kenya adopted a system of “devolution” in its 2010 Constitution, 
implemented in 2013. While under discussion since long before, the 
choice for devolution was in part a response to the violent outburst of 
ethnic violence in 2007/2008. The Constitution of Kenya recognized a 
national government and 47 counties and distributed powers between 
the two levels of government. The first term of office of national 
and county governments ended in August 2017. The system is very 
new but has been relatively successful in diffusing ethnic tension and 
decentralizing state resources to rural Kenya. Kenya remains seized, 
however, with the challenge of managing a very diverse population, a 
deep rural/urban divide and a fragmented political system, driven by 
ethnic considerations.
2 USING FEDERALISM TO ACCOMMODATE ETHNIC /  
 LANGUAGE DIVERSITY
2.1 Introduction
Perhaps the most fundamental question that emerging federations 
face is whether and how federalism can assist to accommodate 
cultural, ethnic and/or language diversity. In particular, whether or not 
subnational units, be they states, regions or local authorities, should be 
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demarcated along cultural, ethnic and/or language boundaries. 
2.2 South Africa
The South African Constitution recognizes eleven official languages, 
many of whom correlate with ethnic groups. It is thus safe to say 
that South Africa comprises ethno-linguistic groups. South Africa 
never deliberately pursued ethnic boundaries for its provinces or 
local authorities. Boundaries were instead drawn on the basis of 
functional criteria related to issues such as topography, spatial patterns, 
functional economies etc. This is unsurprising as the suppression 
of the black majority during apartheid was premised on so-called 
“ethnic boundaries.” At the same time, there was pressure during the 
constitutional negotiations (particularly from the powerful isiZulu-
speaking community) for the recognition of a Zulu territory. What 
ultimately emerged is what some call “watermark” ethnic federalism: 
South Africa’s provincial boundaries are not ethnic and none of the 
provinces bear ethnic names, except for KwaZulu-Natal. However, if 
one lays South Africa’s language map over the provincial boundaries, 
it becomes clear that many of South Africa’s provinces are homes to 
specific language groups. This has worked relatively well for South 
Africa. By not pinning the federal system on ethnic considerations, 
ethnic mobilization was dis-incentivized while there still is a subdued 
sense of belonging for language groups in specific provinces.
This does not mean that ethnic mobilization around boundaries does 
not happen. Some of the most pernicious boundary disputes at local 
government level had distinct ethnic dimensions, indicating that the 
system of determining boundaries is not immune to ethnic pressure.
2.3 Ethiopia
Whereas South Africa sought to avoid using ethnicity as an organising 
principle because of its apartheid history, Ethiopia explicitly based 
its federal system on ethnicity, also because of its history. Ethiopia’s 
ethnic-based liberation movements - coming out of more than a 
century of “internal colonization” by one ethnic group, the Amhara 
- finally brought down Mengistu’s totalitarian regime, one that had 
lasted from 1977 to 1991. Thus, the federal system, too, is explicitly 
ethnic-based, founded on the principle that each ethnic group should 
have control over the territory it hails from. This principle has been 
followed through in the manner in which the boundaries of regional 
states were drawn. They were not drawn up with reference to 
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functional criteria. By and large, they coincide with the boundaries of 
ethnic and language communities.
There is no doubt that this approach has contributed to Ethiopia’s 
ability to accommodate its very diverse language, cultural and ethnic 
diversity. However, there are limits to this approach’s ability to manage 
the complexities in Ethiopia. First, right from the onset, Ethiopia 
could not follow through completely on the principle of having the 
subnational boundaries coincide with ethic groups. Because there are 
81 different ethnic groups, only five states contain one major ethnic 
group; the four other states comprise multiple groups, but with 
further ethnic accommodation at local government. Most notable 
is the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples State, a region 
that is in fact home to a large number of ethnic groups. Secondly, 
putting ethnicity at the centre of the federal system has made ethnicity 
into prime currency in politics, at the expense of efficiency and 
developmental criteria. Thirdly, Ethiopia is rapidly urbanising and its 
cities are melting pots of languages, cultures and ethnicities. Yet, they 
are located in a federal system that assumes they can be ‘allocated’ to 
one particular ethnic group. This has become a site of contestation in 
Ethiopia.
2.4 Kenya
Kenya, also home to numerous ethnic groups, became independent 
in 1963 with a semi-federal type constitution to accommodate ethnic 
groups falling outside the dominant Kikuyu and Luo groups. But 
the federation was short-lived, and for the next forty years it was 
a centrist government, dominated by one or other of the two main 
ethnic groups. When the 2010 Constitution was drafted, the question 
was how to accommodate ethnicity. The idea of establishing nine 
large regions where the major ethnic groups would be dominant was 
rejected as that could lead to ethnic clashes, as witnessed in 2007. 
The solution then chosen was to break up the large ethnic groups 
through creating a number of small counties – 47 in number. However, 
when boundaries were drawn, the drafters used the old colonial 
administrative boundaries, which were based on ethnicity. So, the 2010 
constitution reintroduced ethnic entities through the backdoor. This, in 
turn, has resulted in some conflicts during the 2017 elections.
3 SPECIAL AUTONOMY
3.1 Introduction
It is not uncommon for federal constitutions to afford special status 
to specific territories. This type of special autonomy is often granted 
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for historic or political reasons. It ranges from far reaching autonomy 
resulting in near-independence to lighter asymmetrical arrangements 
granting extra constitutional powers to specific regions, states or 
provinces.
3.2 South Africa
In the 1993 Constitution, which served as a peace-making treaty, right 
wing Afrikaners were given a special dispensation; as an expression of 
the right to self-determination they could establish a “people’s state” 
if they could show any area where they were in the majority. This 
concession was given because they wielded considerable clout through 
the outgoing apartheid security establishment. As they failed to show 
any exclusively Afrikaner area in South Africa, these provisions fell 
away in the final 1996 Constitution. The South African Constitution 
thus does not grant any of the nine provinces special status. All nine 
provinces have equal status and enjoy equal constitutional powers. 
The Constitution does still include a provision on the right to “self-
determination”, within the territory of South Africa, of any community 
sharing a common cultural and language heritage, but can only be 
exercised in terms of an act of Parliament. It was however never given 
content to because an act of Parliament was never adopted.
3.3 Kenya
None of Kenya’s 49 counties enjoy any special constitutional status; 
they have all the same powers and functions, irrespective of their size 
and wealth. The county of Nairobi, the capital city, with over three 
million people but a small territory, thus enjoys the same rights and 
powers as the county with the smallest population (less than 250 000) 
and a huge semi-arid territory.
3.4 Ethiopia
Ethiopia’s nine regional states also have equal status in the 
Constitution and there is no provision for any special autonomy for a 
specific regional state. However, the Ethiopian Constitution explicitly 
recognizes an “unconditional right to self-determination, including the 
right to secession.” A “Nation, Nationality or People” may petition to 
secede from the regional state it finds itself in or from the Ethiopian 
state altogether. The criteria are strict and the procedure very 
burdensome. Since the adoption of the Constitution in 1995, no group 
has even attempted to secede from the Ethiopian state.
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4 CITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
4.1 Introduction
When federalism was first used as a state structure for emerging 
nations, it did not pay much attention to local government. Local 
government was not mentioned in the constitutions of early 
federations, such as the United States and Australia. It was seen as a 
responsibility of the states or provinces to determine their own system 
of local government in subnational constitutions and/or subnational 
legislation. In other words, local government existed as a result of 
state or provincial legislation and was governed exclusively by state 
or provincial legislation. In more recent federal constitutions, i.e. 
those that were adopted in the second half of the 20th century or 
later, it became more common to include provisions related to local 
government in the constitution. This is as a result of the growing 
importance of local government and cities in particular. Examples 
are the constitutions of Germany, India, Nigeria, South Africa and 
Nepal. These constitutions pay specific attention to local government. 
The level of constitutional protection of course depends on what the 
constitution provides exactly. This, in turn, is dependent on factors 
such as the political context within which the constitution was agreed 
upon, historical factors and the push and pull of central-local politics. 
What many emerging federations have in common, though, is that 
urbanization and the consequent rise of strong cities puts pressure on 
the federal system to properly address the role of local government.
4.2 South Africa
South Africa’s Constitution provides for three orders of government 
and explicitly recognizes and protects local government. The 
Constitution provides that local government is one of the three 
“spheres of government” that make up the South African state and 
municipalities are allocated powers by the Constitution itself. This 
has a specific background in South African political history and 
the positions of the main parties to the constitutional negotiations. 
The liberation movements, led by the ANC, wanted a powerful 
central government. They disliked federalism, which was associated 
with racial and ethnic segregation. At the same time, the ANC had 
a strong affinity with local government which had been a major 
site for struggle against apartheid. The outgoing National Party 
viewed federalism and decentralization as a mechanism to curb the 
dominance of central government. The Inkatha Freedom Party, a 
strong ethnic-based movement in KwaZulu, wanted federalism and 
a recognition of regional identity. Local government emerged as a 
form of decentralization assured of support by all major negotiating 
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parties. The end result was a Constitution that provides for a quasi-
federal state, with the powers of provinces diluted by strong local 
governments. While provinces are tasked with supervising local 
governments, they do not control what local governments do. There 
are a number of features of the South African local government 
design that continue to define and sometimes complicate the central-
provincial-local relations.
First, the intergovernmental funding local governments receive comes 
from national government and not from the provinces. This reduces 
the provincial influence over local government. 
Secondly, the Constitution tasks both national and provincial 
governments with overseeing local governments. This has resulted in 
overlapping responsibilities and overregulation.
Thirdly, none of the cities have federal status. Even the biggest cities 
operate under the supervision of provinces. Given that provinces 
are relatively weak in terms of powers and financial autonomy, this 
places powerful cities under emasculated provinces. The cities of 
Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane (economic and political 
powerhouses) are supervised by the Gauteng Province. In reality, 
however, these three cities are more powerful than the province given 
their financial, economic and political importance.
4.3 Kenya
Kenya’s devolution revolves around the 47 counties and the 
Constitution pays little, if any regard, to local government structures 
below the counties. Cities and urban areas are recognized as 
administrative units within the county. However, its largest city and 
capital, Nairobi is a county in its own right. Despite this, it has been 
argued that, in empowering counties only, the Kenyan Constitution has 
marginalized local democracy.
4.4 Ethiopia
The Ethiopian Constitution leaves local government to the regional 
states. It constitutes the federation primarily on the basis of the nine 
regional states and the federal government. Two cities have federal 
status, namely Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. These are governed by 
special charters. All other local governments exist and are regulated by 
constitutions and legislation adopted by the nine regional states. Addis 
Ababa’s status as a federal city has not prevented continuous claims 
being made on the back of Ethiopia’s ethnic federal logic, in particular 
that the city belongs to one specific ethnic group. This has proved to be 
a particularly intractable political problem for Ethiopia.
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5 DEMOCRACY AT REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEVEL
5.1 Introduction
One of the most important indicators of subnational autonomy is 
the question as to whether the citizens of a particular territory, be it 
regional or local, are permitted to elect their own regional or local 
leaders. If political leadership is (partly) imposed by the central 
government, this often has a centralizing effect. 
Another critical question relates to how regional or local leaders 
are elected. This relates to electoral system used for electing public 
representatives. It also relates to the question as whether the executive 
is directly elected or indirectly elected, i.e. the choice between elements 
of either a parliamentary system or a presidential system. The choices 
made with respect to these matters have a significant impact on how 
the management of the intergovernmental system.
5.2 South Africa
The South African Constitution establishes provincial and local 
democracy. Provincial legislatures are elected by the voters in the 
province and municipal councils are elected by the voters in the 
municipality. There is thus no imposition of national political leaders 
into provincial or municipal legislatures.
Following a parliamentary system, provincial legislatures elect a 
provincial premier and municipal councils elect a mayor. So the 
provincial and municipal executives are indirectly elected. A premier 
or mayor remains in power for as long as he or she enjoys the support 
of the legislature. The politics of the majority in the legislature or the 
council is thus always aligned with the politics of the executive.
Public representatives at national and provincial level are elected on 
the basis of proportional representation, in other words via party lists 
and not to represent specific constituencies. The only exception is local 
government where half of the seats are elected by ward representatives 
(who are mostly party aligned). Political parties are therefore very 
powerful across the three spheres of government. In fact, the ANC 
controls eight out of the nine provinces making it a powerful 
integrating force in central-provincial relations. It also controls the 
vast majority of local governments. The party hegemony across the 
three spheres of government and, importantly, between legislatures and 
executives, had a stabilising and integrating effect on the multilevel 
government system, particularly in the early years. For example, as 
the new provinces and local governments began to use their spending 
powers and the risk of illegitimate and frivolous expenditure arose, 
the national government could lay down the gauntlet and insist on 
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fiscal prudence. Similarly, intergovernmental disputes could be kept 
at a minimum as most disputes between spheres of government could 
be solved politically. However, the ANC party hegemony is waning 
and the strength of the intergovernmental system is being tested more 
than ever before. First, the ANC is internally divided and has therefore 
lost much of its momentum to unify actors across the three spheres of 
government. Secondly, the ANC suffered a major defeat in the 2016 
local government elections and now has to tolerate that four of the 
eight metropolitan municipalities are controlled by the Democratic 
Alliance, an opposition party. The ANC is also no longer guaranteed 
to maintain control over so many provinces when the 2019 elections 
come. 
An important lesson to take away from the South African experience 
is that it was wise to carefully build a system of intergovernmental 
relations even though all three spheres of government were by and 
large controlled by one party. Now that there is more political diversity 
across the three spheres, that system of intergovernmental relations can 
be put to use to ensure coherence and avoid disputes as far as possible. 
5.3 Ethiopia
The Ethiopian Constitution (as do subnational constitutions) ensures 
that each subnational level of government, i.e. regional and local 
governments, is elected by voters in the corresponding jurisdiction. 
Ethiopia follows a parliamentary system with national, regional and 
municipal executives elected by the respective legislatures. Ethiopia 
uses a constituency-based electoral system (one representative elected 
per constituency). The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF), a broad coalition of national and regional parties, is 
firmly in control of the federal government, all nine regional states 
and all local authorities. There is little doubt that the EPRDF has been 
able to use the “first-past-the-post” electoral system to secure electoral 
victories of 100 per cent in all legislatures.
As will be highlighted later, alignment and coherence across the three 
levels of government is pursued mainly through EPRDF channels with 
little or no resort to intergovernmental relations. At first sight, this 
seems to have served Ethiopia well. Backed by a political party with 
immense power across all levels of government and a “democratic 
centralism” ethos, the federal government has been able to vigorously 
pursue a state-led development strategy and achieve robust economic 
growth. However, the growing tension between major ethnic groups 
and a ferocious dispute over the status of Addis Ababa are testing the 
EPRDF’s ability to subdue sectarian violence. One of the gestures made 
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by the federal government to those seeking a less rigid political system 
has been to revisit the electoral system and make it less hostile to 
smaller parties. (See Section 10.3)
5.4 Kenya
The Kenyan Constitution also ensures that county governments 
(consisting of a county assembly and a county governor) are elected by 
the voters in that county. Members of the county assembly are elected 
from county wards. The county governor is directly elected and thus 
not dependent on the support of the county assembly. This has added 
complexity to the politics of the emerging counties as the governor 
and the county assembly often pursue different politics. The many 
disputes between governors and legislatures in the same county have 
been a source of instability in the new system. Although Kenya follows 
a first past the post system, because the parties are very concentrated 
(ethnic-based), the national legislature is more or less representative of 
minority parties, although it is not always the case at county level. The 
2010 Constitution has also introduced the rule that in the national and 
county legislatures, there should not be more than two thirds from one 
gender (a third should be women). 
6 AUTONOMOUS POWERS AT REGIONAL AND LOCAL  
 LEVEL
6.1 Introduction
The manner in which the Constitution distributes powers between 
orders of government in a federal or decentralized state is critical. 
Many of the modern constitutions of multilevel states use mixtures 
of mechanisms such as concurrent powers held by multiple levels of 
government, exclusive powers held by only one level of government, 
residual powers, distinguishing broad regulation and policy making 
from execution etc. Very often, the courts are positioned as umpires to 
resolve disputes over who does what in a multilevel state (See section 
11.1).
Two questions matter in particular, namely 1) which functional areas 
are allocated to which level of government and 2) what powers 
(i.e. legislative, executive or administrative) can that subnational 
government exercise with respect to such a functional area. 
6.2 South Africa
The South African Constitution uses lists of concurrent and 
exclusive powers to divide authority between national and provincial 
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governments. There is a short list of exclusive provincial powers, and 
a much longer list of concurrent powers shared by the national and 
provincial governments. All unlisted policy areas fall exclusively under 
the national government’s jurisdiction. The national government 
thus controls virtually all security and judicial powers. Key powers 
such as controlling mining, land, higher education and defence are 
also exclusively national. Provincial governments share with national 
governments most of the big social spending powers, such as social 
development, primary and secondary education, housing and health. 
In principle both national and provincial governments have the same 
authority with respect to concurrent matters. If there is conflict 
between a national and a provincial law, the Constitutional Court (See 
Section 11.2) must determine which law prevails. Finally, provincial 
governments have control over a list of exclusively provincial 
functions. However, this list is short and contains little that matters. 
Local governments have also been allocated constitutionally protected 
powers, for example with respect to land use regulation and municipal 
services such as water, sanitation, electricity and roads.
First, the picture that emerges is one of “hourglass” federalism where 
the national and local government levels are strong but the provincial 
system in the middle enjoys little protection. This is accentuated by the 
allocation of fiscal powers (See Section 7.2).
Secondly, South Africa’s provinces have not pushed the envelope when 
it comes to their constitutional powers. While they could exercise 
concurrent powers and do so to differ from the national government, 
the reality is that provinces rarely pass any laws on concurrent 
matters. The background is political and financial and will be discussed 
throughout the other themes of this paper.   
 
Thirdly, local governments and cities in particular have successfully 
defended themselves again national and provincial infractions on their 
powers. For them, the constitutional protection of their powers has 
been meaningful. For many smaller local governments, however, the 
allocation of constitutional powers means little as they struggle to 
perform even the most basic of functions.
Fourthly, soon after the introduction of the Constitution, it emerged 
that the lists of exclusive and concurrent powers actually provide little 
clarity as to what actually ought to happen where. The complexities in 
health, education, housing, environment and land use proved infinitely 
more complex than the single words in the constitutional lists that 
try to apportion them to spheres. As a result it was often not clear 
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from the Constitution where one sphere’s power ends and the other 
sphere’s power begins. Further legislation to clarify cut-off points, the 
occasional Constitutional Court judgment to solve a powers dispute 
but most importantly, intergovernmental relations, is thus relied upon 
to deal with the “fuzzy edges” of the constitutional division of powers.
6.3 Ethiopia 
In the Ethiopian Constitution the division of powers is done in 
exactly the opposite way to that in South Africa. There is a lengthy 
list of exclusive federal powers, which include the usual competences 
of a federal government. The states are then given the exclusive 
powers with regard to all matters not listed in the exclusive federal 
list. Thus, the scope of the states’ powers is then dependent on how 
broad the federal competences are interpreted. Some commentators 
say that the scope of exclusive state powers is in fact quite limited. 
A further limitation of states’ power is also the broad power of the 
federal government “to formulate and implement the country’s 
policies, strategies and plans in respect of overall economic, social and 
development matters” (art. 51.2 Constitution). In the end, the residual 
powers of states are rather empty.
6.4 Kenya
The Kenyan Constitution, in contrast to Ethiopia, provides two lists 
of powers: one for the national government and the other for the 
counties, but in a very confusing manner. The national list gives the 
national government a long list of exclusive competences, including the 
usual of international relations, military, policing, financial institutions. 
The list also contains powers in which the legislative ability of the 
national government is restricted to making national policy (which 
means providing framework legislation that leaves the counties to 
fill in the details and operations). The powers in the county list are 
not exclusive to the counties. To the extent that they overlap with 
the national government’s power, they are concurrent and there is a 
provision for dealing when there is a conflict between national and 
county laws. The Constitution also provides that for greater certainty, 
the national government may make laws on any matter, thus making all 
county competences concurrent. 
The lesson to take from Kenya is that the lack of clarity in the division 
of powers has led (and will lead) to conflict between the two levels, 
conflicts that the courts must then sort out. 
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7 DIVISION OF REVENUE RAISING POWERS
7.1 Introduction
Discussions about the power to raise revenue go to the heart of what 
federalism and decentralization is about and aims to achieve. Whether 
or not subnational governments have the power to raise revenue, i.e. 
collect taxes and/or charge for services, is an important indicator of the 
degree of autonomy they enjoy. A region, state or city that is entirely 
dependent on funds allocated by the central government will inevitably 
have less discretion than a region, state or city sustained by the taxes 
that it collects, or by the services that it charges for. The division 
of revenue raising powers therefore says much about the degree of 
decentralization, sometimes more than the division of functional 
powers.
Linked to this is the fact that regional or local revenue generation 
enhances accountability. Regional or local politicians will feel 
accountable to local taxpayers rather than to the national government. 
In a situation of dependency on the national government, however, 
there is upward accountability to those who control the purse strings, 
at the expense of local accountability. At the same time, taxing citizens 
or making them pay for services is a complex exercise that makes 
politicians unpopular. Therefore, subnational governments sometimes 
prefer receiving revenue from the central coffers rather than to make 
the effort of collecting taxes and charging for services.
7.2 South Africa
In South Africa, revenue generation powers are located at national 
and municipal level with provinces having little or no revenue 
raising authority. The Constitution reserves all the major taxation 
powers (income tax, value-added tax, corporate tax) for the national 
government. Local governments have the constitutional authority to 
levy property tax and charge for fees provided. Provinces have no 
constitutional taxing powers and very limited ability to charge fees. 
This division underscores the “hourglass model” of South African 
federalism and is no coincidence. While the ANC accepted the 
introduction of constitutionally protected provinces, it did not want 
provinces to become too powerful and rather accepted the fiscal 
autonomy of local governments. This division has been fundamental 
to shaping South Africa’s multilevel government system. It has 
contributed to the strong national-provincial integration of laws, 
policies and budget priorities. It has also removed the incentive on the 
part of provinces to use their constitutional powers to differ from the 
national government. The provincial authority to differ, for example 
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by adopting provincial legislation with province-specific rules on how 
to subsidize low cost housing, may be there. However, the prospect 
of having to plead with the national government to fund the different 
approach, is usually enough to make the provincial government back 
away and fall in line with the national approach. Local governments, 
particularly the big cities, have developed more of an autonomous 
status on the back of their constitutionally guaranteed revenue raising 
powers. The fact that they may tax property and charge for municipal 
services makes them less reliant on national government transfers. 
Transfers constitute only 26 per cent of municipal budgets while they 
constitute 97 per cent of provincial budgets. 
7.3 Ethiopia
In the Ethiopian Constitution of 1995 the federal government and the 
states are able to jointly levy and collect taxes, including income and 
corporate taxes. This provision was amended to delegate the power 
of levying and collecting such joint taxes to the federal government. 
The result has been that states collect little of their own revenue and 
are financially dependent on transfers from the central government. 
Local governments, in turn, have, in terms of state constitutions, only 
delegated revenue-raising powers, which are negligible so that they are 
almost entirely dependent on state transfers.
7.4 Kenya
In Kenya, most taxes are reserved for the national government with 
counties only controlling property taxation and entertainment taxes. 
The property taxation system is underdeveloped and counties are 
reluctant to impose taxes, choosing to rely on their equitable share 
of revenue raised nationally. The Constitution provides that counties 
are entitled to at least 15 per cent of the national revenue. In fact they 
receive slightly over 20 per cent of the national revenue. Counties 
also raise revenue by charging for services they are constitutionally 
empowered to deliver. However, in most cases the national 
government still delivers those services and thus collects the fees. All 
in all, counties therefore rely on the national government for most of 
their funding.
8 DEALING WITH REGIONAL INEQUITY
8.1 Introduction
Autonomy for regions or states can compound regional inequity, 
particularly if subnational governments raise much or all of their 
own revenue. Urbanized regions or states with vibrant economies are 
then likely to do better than rural regions or states with little or no 
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economic activity. Differences in the quality of public services may 
increase, making the federal compact less sustainable. Federalism 
therefore almost always involves a redistributive role for the federal or 
central government.
8.2 South Africa
The deep spatial inequality, facilitated by racial and ethnic segregation 
and exploitation, made ensuring equity across the nine provinces into a 
critical theme in the design of the South African multilevel state. There 
are three constitutional features can be regarded as the most crucial 
levellers in the context of regional inequity.
First, the Constitution includes a Bill of Rights that guarantees 
fundamental rights for every individual, regardless of his or her 
location. This Bill of Rights includes socio-economic rights such as 
the right to water, sanitation, housing, education and food. These 
rights are enforceable in court. There have been many court judgments 
in which national, provincial or municipal governments have been 
compelled to deliver on these rights. These rights also impact on policy 
and legislation. There are national minimum standards for many public 
services, formulated in national laws, policies and practices. The Bill of 
Rights has influenced the formulation of these standards.
Secondly, the Constitution makes the national government responsible 
for redistribution. This reduces the scope for differences between 
provinces. Provinces do not raise much revenue and the most buoyant 
taxes (income tax, company tax, value-added tax etc.) are collected by 
the national government. Because the national government controls the 
division of nationally generated revenue, provinces play a minor role in 
redistributing resources from wealthier to poorer areas.
Thirdly, each province and each local government is constitutionally 
entitled to an “equitable share” of national revenue. South Africa uses 
an advanced, formula-based system of dividing nationally generated 
revenue. Every year, Parliament adopts a Division of Revenue Act 
that divides the revenue generated nationally between the three 
spheres of government and between the nine provinces and 257 
local governments. The division is based on a set of constitutional 
criteria that place a high premium on trying to level the playing field 
between provinces and between municipalities. The actual equitable 
share formula for provinces uses factors such as education and health 
needs, population, poverty and economic output. The formula for 
local government considers the cost of providing free services to poor 
people and delivering basic services.
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8.3 Ethiopia
There are large differences in the level of development among the 
various states. Although the Constitution does not deal with the 
matter directly, the federal government is seized with the matter. As 
the federal government collects most of the revenue, that government 
also performs the function of the equitable redistribution revenue 
among the states. Given that the states raise only about 20 per cent of 
their income, they are largely dependent on transfers. Although the 
vertical division of finances is determined by Ethiopia’s second house 
of Parliament, the House of Federation, the split between the states is 
done by the federal government. The formula used is driven by three 
main factors: population size, fiscal capacity, and expenditure needs.
8.4 Kenya
One of the reasons for devolution in Kenya was to ensure that there 
is a more equitable distribution of resources across the country. This 
is done in two ways. First, as is the case in South Africa, each county’s 
equitable share of the revenue raised nationally is determined by a 
formula (adopted by the second house of Parliament, the Senate) which 
is informed, among other factors, by “economic disparities within 
and among counties and the need to remedy them,” and “the need 
for affirmative action in respect of disadvantaged areas and groups” 
(art 203 Kenya Constitution). Second, the Constitution establishes 
an “Equalisation Fund”, which receives every year 0.5 per cent of the 
revenue raised nationally, to provide basic services to marginalized 
areas to bring them on the same level as the rest of the country.
9 USING SHARED RULE TO BRING DIVERSE   
 COMMUNITIES TOGETHER
9.1 Introduction
No matter how strict the division of powers between levels of 
government, they will have to collaborate to deliver public services and 
ensure development. Any system of multilevel government requires 
its component parts to collaborate around joint projects, consult on 
matters of mutual interest, align programmes and share information.
9.2 South Africa
South Africa’s multilevel government system relies heavily on 
intergovernmental collaboration. The parties to the constitutional 
negotiations (the ANC in particular) were worried that deep, 
competitive federalism would tear the country apart and result 
in fragmentation and inequality. This is one of the reasons by the 
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Constitution itself puts a premium on cooperation, rather than 
competition. First, the Constitution provides for a number of national 
institutions, where two or three levels of government come together in 
a manifestation of shared rule. 
• The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) is the most 
prominent shared rule institution. It is the second chamber of 
Parliament, comprising delegates from all nine provinces. In 
addition, the Constitution guarantees local government non-
voting seats. All new legislation is discussed in the NCOP. If the 
law affects provinces, the NCOP can stop a bill from being passed 
into law. If it doesn’t the NCOP can cause considerable delays in 
the passing of a bill. 
• Another shared rule institution is the Fiscal and Financial 
Commission (FFC), a national commission tasked with advising 
government on intergovernmental fiscal matters. It comprises 
representatives of all three spheres of government. The annual 
cycle to determine how much money the national government 
will transfer to provinces and municipalities always starts with the 
FFC’s advice.
• The constitutional recognition of organized local government 
is also an important feature of intergovernmental relations. It is 
designed to give local government a seat at the table of national 
and provincial dialogues.
In addition to these national shared rule institutions, the Constitution 
dedicates an entire chapter to “Cooperative Governance,” i.e. the duty 
on organs of state in different spheres of to work together by keeping 
each other informed, consulting on matters of common interest, 
resolving disputes etc. South Africa’s law and practice of governance 
across the three spheres is replete with both statutory and informal 
forums and processes, focused on intergovernmental dialogue. A key 
example is the gathering called the “MinMEC,” a regular meeting of 
a national minister (“Min”) with his or her provincial counterparts 
(members of provincial executive councils - “MEC”). These meetings 
are used to discuss draft legislation, intergovernmental projects, new 
governance initiatives etc. They exist in all sectors where national and 
provincial governments share authority. At provincial level, the premier 
regularly convenes a “Premier’s Coordinating Forum” for provincial 
and local politicians to discuss matters of common interest. At the apex 
of this system stands the President’s Coordinating Council, a regular 
meeting of the president with key national, provincial and municipal 
officials. The architecture of these cooperative governance institutions 
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is laid down in a dedicated law (the Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework Act). In addition, there are numerous processes through 
which organs of state in different spheres of government attempt to 
align their budgets, spatial plans and their strategic plans.
First, the NCOP never truly became a house of provinces. Because 
eight of the nine provinces are controlled by the same party, its 
delegates bring a party political perspective, rather than a provincial 
perspective to the NCOP. As a result, the NCOP emulates Parliament 
but with fewer members and less resources. 
Secondly, the architecture of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) 
forums insufficiently recognized the importance of cities. In theory, 
cities such as Johannesburg were expected to engage the IGR system 
in provincial forums, alongside small municipalities. This was never 
going to work as cities need direct, bilateral engagement with national 
governments. As a result, alternative structures and forums centred 
around national-city engagement have emerged. 
Thirdly, while the regular convening of politicians across spheres of 
government helps to sustain cooperation, there is the often-heard 
complaint that they are “talkshops.” IGR forums must go beyond 
symbolism and conference-style presentations into more programmatic 
engagement.
9.3 Ethiopia
Ethiopia’s Constitution, with its emphasis on ethnic federalism, does 
not explicitly call for or recognize intergovernmental relations between 
or among levels of government. However, its House of Federations 
is a “self-rule” structure as it brings together representatives of all 
recognized ethnic groups (and thus the nine regional states only 
indirectly). It has played a modest role in facilitating intergovernmental 
dialogue and resolving conflicts between and among levels of 
government. Ethiopia has not adopted legislation to structure 
intergovernmental relations. There also has been little or no incentive 
to do so as the ruling coalition controls all nine regional states and all 
local governments. Therefore, the political party channels could be 
relied upon for intergovernmental planning and collaboration. 
9.4  Kenya
The Kenyan Parliament has also a second chamber, the Senate, 
composed of directly elected senators in each of the 47 counties. There 
are also “special interest” senators representing women, youth and 
persons with disability. (The Senate may not be composed of more 
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than two thirds of one gender.) The task of the Senate is to represent 
the counties in the national Parliament in policy and law-making with 
regard to matters affecting counties, including determining, as noted 
above, the formula for sharing the equitable share of revenue raised 
nationally between the counties. In practice the relationship between 
the senators and the county governors has not always been smooth as 
both compete for power within the county. 
The Kenyan Constitution also contains, in a manner very similar 
to South Africa, a number of provisions capturing the principles of 
cooperative government, including the duty to consult and avoid 
settling intergovernmental disputes through litigation. In terms of 
the Intergovernmental Relations Act of 2012, provision is made for 
National and County Government Co-ordinating Summit whose 
members include the president and the 47 country governors. There 
is also a Council of Governors the mandate of which is to enhance the 
sharing of knowledge, consultation and cooperation between counties. 
10 CENTRAL CO-ORDINATION OF SUB-NATIONAL UNITS 
10.1 Introduction
The management of a system of multilevel government often requires 
a focal point at central government level. National departments, 
responsible for the coordination of legislation, policies and 
programmes affecting subnational governments are very common in 
younger federations and decentralized states. At times, the “centre of 
government” (i.e. the prime minister or president) plays this role but 
often there is a dedicated department or ministry tasked with this. 
10.2 South Africa
Ever since the inception of South Africa’s system of multilevel 
government, there has been a national department responsible 
for the central coordination of provincial and local governments. 
Initially, this task was housed under the Department of Constitutional 
Development. It was then renamed the Department for Provincial 
and Local Government and it is now known as the Department of 
Cooperative Governance, headed by a national Minister. In every 
province, an equivalent exists, headed by a provincial minister.
From 1994 to 2005, the national department played a crucial role in 
designing the new system of multilevel government, particularly with 
respect to the legal framework for local government. It spearheaded 
the adoption of legislation pertaining to local government boundaries, 
institutions, elections, systems, property taxation and also a broad 
framework law on intergovernmental relations. After that, its attention 
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shifted to overseeing the system of intergovernmental relations and 
conducting monitoring, evaluation and oversight. It has struggled to 
perform these tasks effectively. Some of the reasons are set out below.
The first observation is that the Department’s oversight focuses almost 
exclusively on local government. Local governments are subjected to 
comprehensive, statutory monitoring routines but far less attention is 
being paid to monitoring provinces. 
The second observation relates to the problem of delineating the roles 
of national sector departments (i.e. departments responsible for water, 
sanitation, housing etc.) and the role of the Department of Cooperative 
Governance vis-à-vis local government. Given the fact that the work 
of almost all national departments intersect with local government one 
way or another, they often compete with the national Department of 
Cooperative Governance to oversee local government. This problem 
has been the most pronounced with respect to the overlapping 
responsibilities of the National Treasury and the Department of 
Cooperative Governance. The National Treasury spearheaded 
municipal finance legislation and oversees its implementation while 
the Department of Cooperative Governance oversees governance and 
intergovernmental relations. It goes without saying that these matters 
continuously overlap. Given the importance of the purse strings, 
carefully controlled by the National Treasury, it has upstaged the 
Department of Cooperative Governance in many respects.
10.3 Ethiopia 
Ethiopia has what is often referred to as a dual federal system and as 
a rule the federal  (central) government is not supposed to involve 
in sub-state matters. However, it has a wide range of legislative and 
policy-making powers on social and economic matters which allow it 
to directly or indirectly influence state and sub-state matters. 
Unlike in South Africa, no single ministry or a federal institution is 
in charge of dealing with states and local government matters. The 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, which is in charge 
of channelling federal grants to the states, ensures that state policies 
and plans are aligned to federal policies and plans. Again, under the 
dual federal system, the federal government is not allowed to regulate 
local governments which are, under the federal Constitution, solely 
state functions. However, its policy making power on social matters 
allows it to coordinate, though indirectly, social service provisions 
at local level. In 2001 the federal government thus established a 
Ministry of Capacity Building which, among others, was charged with 
coordinating the “district level decentralization programme (DLDP)” 
aimed at empowering local governments. The Ministry was dissolved 
after having implemented the DLDP. There is a Ministry of Federal 
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Affairs which interacts with the states and ethnic-based sub-state units 
(zones and liyu-woredas) and deals with issues of ethnic management. 
The Ministry of Urban Development and Construction coordinates the 
activities of cities in the country. 
10.4 Kenya
As noted in the sections above, the national government has 
overarching policy-making powers that it is required to exercise in 
consultation with the county governments. At the national level, the 
Ministy of Devolution and Planning is mandated with coordination 
of all matters related to devolved governance and intergovernmental 
relations. In the transition period, which lasted from 2010 until 
2015 (a total of five years), a statutory body, the Transition Authority 
(TA), was established to supervise the transition to the 2010 
devolved government structures; the Transition Authority reported 
to another interim body, the Commission for the Implementation 
of the Constitution. After the lapse of the TA’s mandate in 2015, a 
technical body named the Intergovernmental Technical Relations 
Committee (IGRTC), established under the legislation dealing with 
Intergovernmental relations, was operationalized. Its broad role is to 
manage relations between the two levels of government and support 
the operations of all intergovermental relations structures in the overall 
system. However, overall national government policies regarding 
devolution are overseen by the Ministry of Devolution, in coordination 
and partnership with the respective sectoral ministries and sectoral 
intergovernmental structures and systems. 
The lack of a political and governance culture of consultation and 
consensus-building (traceable to the previous centralized decision-
making system), lack of capacity to understand the theoretical and 
practical aspects of multilevel governance, and lack of willingness to 
embrace cooperative governance, seem to be the greatest challenges in 
the coordination of devolution affairs in the country. 
11 ROLE OF THE COURTS
11.1 Introduction
Courts can play a crucial role in protecting the integrity of the 
multilevel system of government. Often, they are positioned as a kind 
of umpire to solve conflicts between levels of government, particularly 
as regards their powers. The precise role depends on the constitution.
11.2 South Africa
In South Africa, intergovernmental disputes can be brought to 
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court. Ultimately, the Constitutional Court has the final say in 
intergovernmental disputes. However, the Constitution discourages 
organs of state from going to court before they have tried alternative 
dispute resolution. In the first two decades of democracy, relatively 
few cases of intergovernmental disputes have been settled by the 
courts. This is mostly because of the hegemony of the ANC across the 
three spheres of government and because the South African system of 
multilevel government emphasizes cooperation instead of competition. 
As the ANC’s hegemony is declining (with four metropolitan cities 
governed by the opposition), the courts are being used more to 
settle disputes. Cities, in particular, have turned to the Courts to see 
protection against national and provincial governments encroaching on 
their powers. 
11.3 Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, the courts play no role to solve intergovernmental 
conflicts. This is because the Constitution designates the House of 
Federation, Ethiopia’s second chamber as the institution that must 
settle such conflicts. It is a non-professional institution and decisions 
are made on political grounds.
11.4 Kenya
In Kenya, politics is diverse and fragmented so the courts are used 
extensively to settle intergovernmental disputes. In fact, disputes 
between organs of state within a county also regularly make their 
way to court. This is putting strain on the judiciary: judges at times 
have criticized politicians for inundating the courts with institutional 
and political battles. All in all, the courts have played a crucial role in 
enforcing the rules of Kenya’s young multilevel government system.
12 CONCLUDING REMARKS
From the brief overview of three “federal” countries, the following 
observations can be made: 
• In all three countries ethnicity is an issue, but each country 
approached the matter differently. It would seem that the choice 
is between making ethnicity an organizing principle or merely 
accommodating it. In the first case, the danger exists that by 
entrenching ethnicity conflicts may be exacerbated rather than 
solving them. 
• Although a special autonomous status could be given to a 
particular group in a defined area (depending on the prevailing 
balance of forces), the usual approach is to give all constituent 
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units the same powers and functions.
• Because cities and local government play such an important role 
in the economic and social wellbeing of a nation, it is important 
that in a federal system their role and function should be 
recognized and clearly spelled out in the constitution.
• Democratically elected regional and local legislatures are an 
indispensable part of any federal system. Through the electoral 
system such legislatures should also be inclusive of minority 
groups, including women. 
• The best way of having an effective sharing of power between 
the central and subnational governments is to ensure that there 
is clarity on who does what by having clearly listed powers for 
subnational governments. 
• The trend in all three countries is for subnational government 
to rely on transfers from the central government to support 
their activities (with local government in South Africa being the 
exception). This has reinforced lines of accountability towards 
the central government rather than the subnational governments 
accounting to their own electorates.
• There are, however, also benefits derived from the central 
government raising the bulk of revenue. As all three countries 
exhibit high levels of inequality between different states, 
provinces and counties, the federal government must through the 
transfer system ensure that there is equalization of resources so 
that there is a minimum level of equality in the services provided 
to all citizens. 
• Institutions of shared rule at the national level – both legislative 
and executive – are present in the three countries. The second 
house of Parliament representing the regions, provinces and 
counties has not yet developed much as a single party controls 
both houses. Also, executive intergovernmental relations have 
mostly been an intra-party business. However, as different parties 
may govern at the national and regional levels, an effective system 
of intergovernmental relations is required to ensure coherence 
and avoid disputes as far as possible.
• As a federation is very much a rule-based system of government, 
the courts play an important role to ensure that all parties to the 
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